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Abstract:  
This study provides deeper insight into the linkages between Bank M&A and M&A literature and test 
the hypotheses that Acquirers gain significantly from a M&A strategy. Analyzing the Banking industry 
as an example of Horizontal mergers, the study aims to validate that M&A is a value creating strategy.    
A market model based event study provides robust results. We include private and public targets in the 
period 2006-2015.  
In a study of 24 M&A transactions in Indian Banks during the period 2006 -2015, we find convincing 
evidence for both acquirer and target gains. The t-statistic for Abnormal Returns is significant and 
Positive Abnormal Returns are shown. 
Size and profitability measures are not significant in this sample. Acquirers earning positive returns 
engage in multiple acquisitions and contribute significantly to positive abnormal returns in the sample. 
Acquirer returns depend on both Target and Acquirer Financial characteristics including Target Loan 
Loss provisions, Acquirer Tier I Capital, Acquirer proportion of Fee and Interest Income. The key 
limitation of the study is the unavailability of a larger sample of data. 
Keywords: Banking, Mergers & Acquisitions, Markets for Corporate Control, Horizontal 
mergers, Acquirer returns, India 
JEL Codes: G34, G21, G3, G2, G14   
 
 
  
1. Why do acquirers prefer M&A? 
Mergers & Acquisitions are a universally employed inorganic strategy for banks to scale up in product 
markets and support the economy from within an efficient and well-regulated banking system.  
Banking M&A are often shown to be counter-productive in the literature with contradictory results in the 
US and the UK. All M&A are critically analyzed because they have a large footprint contrasted with 
other PPE investments and/or investments in brand and intangibles.  The study proposes to reestablish 
the merits of the M&A strategy with positive abnormal returns for Acquirers. Our literature review 
establishes that since the integration of Universal Banking memes in 1999 allowing investment banks 
and commercial banks to work under a single roof, global merger and acquisitions accounted for a 
significant part of bank expansions into new markets and products.  (Becher, 2009) 
Banking markets are horizontal, especially so in India and the phenomena of horizontal mergers 
presents an ease of financing meme that becomes a critical theme of our analysis. Insider knowledge 
of your own industry and the resulting expertise makes it imperative for a skilled management to execute 
profitable and successful M&A. Our study shows that serial acquirers gain significantly from their 
experience and succeed in generating positive returns from the M&A strategy. M&A based transactions 
are successful in the Indian economic environment with significant positive abnormal returns to 
acquirers unlike in Bank M&A regimes reflected in the Event study literature. 
A recent study by Tom Piskula (2011) recognizes the availability of new rich data from since the 2000s 
utilizing a Corporate Governance Index from ISS (MSCI Barra) to establish a new convolution in Merger 
analyses using event based studies. Piskula’s work for example shows that weak governance could be 
the reason many acquirers face an adverse reaction to merger announcement. Cornett et al (2003) use 
diversifying mergers within the banking industry to establish the importance of corporate governance 
and agency considerations. We further argue against the easy availability of excuses in a misuse of 
agency theory and some foul play by selfish CEOs and/or maturing industry structures that obliviate 
market returns.    
This research proposes to investigate Indian Banking M&A in the available transactions and assume 
results consistent with Corporate Finance Theory are possible. The study is the first of its kind 
comprehensively covering all major Banking M&A from India instead of comparing a few select 
transactions.  
The analysis confirms the superiority of private information as acquirers pick up private targets making 
the expected significant gains in the transaction valuation. Overvaluations remains a key concern in 
M&A and acquirers are rewarded for being able to pick up well priced assets and thus the flurry of deals 
during the crises periods to the disadvantage of exiting foreign players. These gains reflect on the 
continuing advantage of M&A as an impact strategy, foreign bank exits from India and global policy 
imperatives advantaging the banking superstructure. Our study shows foreign portfolio exits are 
significant opportunity losses for Global players and may not be justified by myopic short-term 
responses to a new policy superstructure, while advantaging Indian Acquirers in value opportunities. 
Banking M&A remains specialized from other M&A because of industry specific features of banks 
including their valuation, their means to profit and their treatment of capital, using deposits and funds 
as raw material for profit generating products. This study shows that Banking sector M&A is economical 
and needs a low barrier of Opportunity costs to execute and overcomes specific deal level outcomes 
that guarantee M&A success. 
Financial performance of mergers has already been studied in detail in the literature. Basu and Chevrieu 
(2011) review the adverse impact of distance and information asymmetry on acquirer returns and 
operating performance. Lei and Li (2016) show how the use of stock as a method of payment iproves 
Acquirer returns especially positive returns when bidders use stock to acquire private targets from  
improved investor  base and reduction in shadow costs. Harris et al(2016) examine the impact of agency 
conflict in takeover negotiations and better monitoring by specific blockholders means higher acquirer 
returns. Bruner (2005) attempts to remove the expectation of losses in M&A with an analysis of specific 
cause of failure. This study affirms our hypotheses that acquirers get a lot of benefits from and are 
rewarded with significant positive abnormal returns in M&A transactions.  There is evidence from our 
sample that acquirers engaging in more than two acquisitions, labeled as Serial acquirers create 
positive returns for the transaction. 
Despite mixed evidence from event studies, event studies remain an effective analysis tool to value 
mergers. The gains from M&A are shared between bidders and targets. The M&A strategy becomes 
key for growth in Emerging Markets and Asia. Our references to economic gains and strategy are 
implied in the Corporate Finance literature spawned in the tradition of Jensen and Meckling (1976) 
Agency Theory, O’Hart and Moore (1990), Property rights and Ownership of the Firm and Williamson 
(1988).  The merger waves are described as proven by Rhodes-Kropf et al (2004) and the neo classical 
theory evidenced first in Maksimovic and Philips (2001). 
Banking valuations and merger financing however separate the study of other M&A in Corporate 
Finance from Banking M&A. This is backed by event study data for India where merger gains are not 
seen to be obfuscated by near zero or negative returns to acquirers. M&A cannot rely on diversions 
such as the undervalued target or the smaller target company walking away with gains. The success of 
an M&A strategy gets tougher to recognize in some industries vis-a-vis others. As mentioned before, in 
Banking, challenges arise because of a perfect horizontal merger being in both market and tender 
transactions and valuations involving intangible assets and human capital (Damodaran, 2012).  
The study reviews M&A studies in general before relating the specific advantages in Banking and then 
discuss the specific case of bank transactions in India. Section 2 presents the literature review. Section 
3 presents the hypotheses for this study. Section 4 details the experiment design while Section 5 
discusses the results from the analysis to bring out how empirical research supports the available theory 
and our hypotheses. Section 6 presents the possible implications. 
 
2. Literature Review 
 
The established advantages of an M&A strategy in the Global literature 
Rhodes-Kropf and Vishwanathan (2004) discuss the presence of Merger waves and relate it to periods 
of overvaluation in stock markets in line with literature that describes industry specific waves that relate 
to long lulls in M&A Activity followed by waves of high activity.  
In IPO firms, Hovaikimian and Hutton (2009) are primarily motivated by a rush for low hanging fruit and 
the reduction of frictions as financing becomes available to acquirers for bigger growth plans and stock 
is used as acquisition currency. 
Merger motivations around Productivity shocks as explained by Maksimovic and Philips(2001) show 
the difference between market leader strategies and diversification strategies. 
Financing the deal 
Cash and stock financing of the deal also clarifies the components of the Financing to be motivated by 
the power equation between the acquirer and the target as also the reliance on a shorter time to 
completion in more cash deals. Derivatives provide sweeteners to the target firm to sweeten the 
acquisition. Control issues also affect choice of mode of financing with owners favoring use of leverage 
instead of equity (Bouzgarro, 2014).  
Andrade et al (2001) and Rappoport (1999) show the move from stock financed acquisitions to cash 
financed acquisitions in the ‘90s. Stock financed acquisitions raise issues of control. Use of stock also 
affects shareholder returns, eased using stock splits and divestments.  
As per the Free Cash Flow hypothesis, the use of debt constrains managers misusing free cash flows 
(Where applicable only Free cash flows to Equity are intended for banks).   
Effects of using Cash to sweeten the deal are likely become more adverse in such value deal making 
in bigger acquisitions especially in a recession as Cash is scrounged from Working Capital flows (Aktas 
et al, 2015) to reduce debt and interest costs.  
Financial Independence   
Jindra and Moeller (2015) identify targets that have lesser dependence on external finance and find in 
favor of lesser deal completion and higher premiums. This goes to traditional event study literature 
ascribing lower returns to bidders in response to concerns on overpricing and hubris in the bid, 
overtaking explicit and implicit deal synergies.  This also corresponds to lower valuations for private 
companies and the related Pre-merger IPO literature. From Hypothesis 2, banking mergers depend 
less on external finance and this improves chances of deal completion in banking mergers.  
Deal Time to completion 
Luypaert and Maeseneire (2015) analyze gains from a deal. They find the deal time to completion is 
affected adversely by deal complexity and hostility as well as the size of the deal.  
Industry wise impact of M&A  
Industry concentration drives M&A activity as evidenced in Geiger and Schiereck (2014) for gaining 
market share in a concentrated industry and increasing conglomerate presence in fragmented industry.   
Deal making in a recession 
Chung (2015) expands on the literature stream that shows macroeconomic impacts on the acquisition 
decision as one affecting deals with target companies overladen with debt or whose growth options are 
no longer good during a recession.   
Tse and Soufani (2001) show how macroeconomic conditions impact Bidder and target returns in 
merger activity terms and that targets are expected to respond to restructuring.  VECM models directly 
measure key boosting impact of M&A activity on the Macroeconomic indicators as in Ali(2010) 
Size effects 
Moeller et al (2004) find the size effect to be a determinant of differences between abnormal returns 
made by bidders. This indicates size of the bidder is a proxy for risk that varies with size and hence 
diversification of business and inability therefore to benefit from a horizontal merger in a specific industry 
target.  
Efficient Contracting 
A key to success in M&A apart from financing and time to completion considerations, and key to the 
deal is Contracting mechanisms from Hart (1990) and Williamson (1988). Markets for Corporate control 
remain sensitive in market perceptions to real advantages accruing from control. A new flexible payout 
contract makes payments to target investors contingent on post- merger performance (Cain et al., 
2011).  
Barragato and Markelevich (2008) find that earnings quality improves after synergy motivated 
acquisitions compared to agency motivated acquisitions. Miletkov et al (2014) find in a sample of Non 
US acquirers that board independence accounts for higher acquirer returns.  
Serial acquirers 
Aktas, de Bodt and Roll (2012) find evidence in favor of the same acquirers making consecutive deals 
in the markets for corporate control. However, the learning from deal making effectively brings down 
abnormal returns for acquirers even over the lifetime of the same CEO. Lower CARs are evidenced in 
the fourth or fifth acquisition by the same company from 1.5% CAR in the first deal to only 0.5% as 
more aggressive deals are priced correctly by the firm owing to its experience.  
Economies of Scale and Scope 
Bastie (2013) looks at a new comparison of startup modes of strategy in gaining a new market vs 
takeover. The analysis can be used as a starting point when the analysis of true Economies of Scope 
is undertaken at a future prognosis demanded by my research. 
Contrary to SCP hypothesis, bank consolidation can actually increase the incidence of relationship 
lending as well, and investments in franchise technology lead to greater access to credit, however there 
is evidence that this credit is thus now biased towards larger borrowers, who can produce evidence 
testable by the hands off underwriting process as well as invest in key relationships at the bank, in both 
cases reducing the role of the credit officer, found to be critical in measuring the stability of a lending 
client traditionally.  Post Consolidation, the bigger entities are however likely to offer the same prices 
across most of their markets.  
Critical to establishment of Economies of scale are studies of Net Interest Margin and Profitability of 
banks. Important and lesser easily available are instances of vertical mergers like the case study of 
Axis Bank and Enam Securities, where the bank added Investment Banking business and thus avenues 
for more advisory and fee based income from the acquisition. Economies of scale have been found to 
be ambivalent in domestic markets despite creation of concentrated markets seen by increase in the 
Lerner index/HHI. 
Beccalli(2007) use data from Europe during 1990-2005 to disprove the ambivalent evidence from earlier 
studies using a translog function to better measure Profitability gains with Cost and Profit Cross 
efficiencies in a merger of two banks as per intuitive decisions made in the boardrooms. Also post crises 
data shows that specific deal based factors may influence both expected abnormal returns because of 
a merger. Here (ibid.) the authors use the Healy method in the general literature to separate the industry 
adjusted performance into both α and β components and improve the specificity of across deal 
specific, bank specific and institutional variables used to control the measurement of performance. 
Beccalli and Frantz (ibid.) use the Thomson ONE M&A database and include Cross efficiencies as the 
measurement of managerial best practices. They also note the persistence of inefficiencies across the 
first 5 -6 years post deal and lay the ground for measuring short term effects independently of the long 
term expectation.   
Schmeider(2010) follows a stream of literature that observes and verifies stunted access to SMEs after 
consolidation as the leap in technology creates more process dependent relationships. 
Market Power and Concentration/fragility 
While many banking studies affirm the existence of monopolistic competition, competition authorities 
like the CCI or the EBA arm of the European Commission are faced with problems of verification in 
each merger or consolidation deal independent of the Central Bank. Regulators should be alert on 
issues of subverting competition, the US market however unique in laying down target ratios in each 
market, that typify the allowed market share boundaries in a consolidation.   
There are contradicting views till date of both Concentration-stability and Concentration fragility, in that 
existence of a few large banks after consolidation leads to better profits and more diversified banks vs 
the view that increased concentration leads to use of TBTF policies taking higher risks and endangering 
the taxpayer’s money with a bailout from governments. However, most studies affirm that markets 
remain truly monopolistic in competition in the SCP paradigm even with the consolidation of banking 
markets into a few large players. Also, studies agree to the fact that the cost of managing crises is 
manageable where monopolies exist and such costs are higher under competition (Berger, 2009a). 
Weiss (2014) analyses the tail risk effects to measure the increase in systemic risk for the acquirer as 
recommended by Acharya (2010) and finds increasing systemic risk, after allowing for Countercyclical 
Capital treatment.   
Deal process  
Gomes et al (2013) discuss the requirement of perfect information across the laborious M&A process.  
A lack of post-closing integration and miscommunication of deal objectives is frequently cited a s a key 
reason for failure of a merger to prove the expected gains. Zhu et al (2014) find that idiosyncratic 
volatility (translated as higher likelihood of deal specific features, negotiations, and processes or 
information) is positively related to acquisition completion and the likelihood of the bidder acquiring 
control and accounts for higher premium. 
Synergy Forecasts 
Certain jurisdictions require bidders to share expected synergies every time they bid in the defined 
calendar enforced by the regulator where multiple bidders are involved ( e.g. UK) 
Dutordoir et al (2014) show synergy disclosures in 345 deals in a sample of 2000 deals. Synergy 
disclosures improve the market reception of the deal and frequently include operational cost benefits 
from post-closing integration that may not account for cultural and institutional differences 
Ibid. show synergy gains to be 5% higher after synergy disclosures. 
Event Studies  
While Event Based studies are a common device for studying Bank mergers, they use equity prices in 
a defined window before and after the merger and settle for evidence of abnormal returns. Earlier 
studies evidenced in the literature (DeYoung, 2009) have shown that such abnormal returns are rare 
and it is seen that the acquirers (larger) earn negative returns after a merger while the targets usually 
show abnormal equity returns after the merger announcement.  The research specifically includes a 
defined window in our market model based event study to account for information leakage before the 
announcement date for the deal. It is important to note that inelasticity in deposit rates that are yet to 
be liberalized in India, mean the changes to borrowers are likely more inelastic on the relationship 
banking side when separating effects from the bank merger on borrowers. Valuing gains offers a 
consistent proposition. 
Aktas, Bodt and Cousin (2007) discuss event contamination in detail though their correction for event 
contamination is not required. 
Fraser and Kolari(2011) reference their own widely accepted methodology for event studies. Here they 
measure welfare of customers consequent to bank mergers.  
Event Studies to measure Post merger performance 
Goddard (2012) extend the DeYoung (2009) study with an event study of the impact of bank M&As on 
shareholder value in emerging markets, and a multivariate analysis of the determinants of changes in 
acquirers’ shareholder value. 
Anand and Singh (2008) conducts an event study on Indian Bank data to provide evidence in the Indian 
market while Jaydev (2007) satisfices with case study analysis of specific deal based determinants of 
Indian mergers up to the period of the study.  
A factorization of post-merger performance can also be based directly on regressions to changes in 
Financial ratios to provide critical static analysis. Wu (2011) separate the Harmony effects, Merger 
efficiency measures and Scale effects. These studies require panel data from financial and market data 
for the banks.  
Though later literature is silent on the same as the relevance of such studies vanished, it is a sine qua 
non that merger led structural changes lead to more services for depositors leading to increased 
consumer welfare for depositors (Berger, 2004).  
More related to earnings management by firms, larger firms typically incorporate their estimates of 
merger costs and synergies in analyst conferences before and during a merger to advantage 
themselves from the smoothing of market sentiment by such announcements. These analyses prove 
the accuracy of such estimates of synergy. Dutordoir (2013) looks at such announcements of synergy 
impacting bidder returns.  
Traditional event based studies of bank mergers studying Cumulative Abnormal Returns including 
Anand and Singh (2008) find direct linkages between a destruction of value for the bidder and a gain in 
value for targets in banking M&A. Our work prefers an extensive study of all M&A transactions in the 
Banking sector to realign the theory with empirical findings and look to affirm our hypotheses. 
 
3. Hypotheses 
 
3.1 Impact transactions 
The visibility of the transaction and the complexity introduced in organizational terms in the M&A 
transaction implies an experiential learning for acquirers, making it easy to isolate winners and predict 
the probability of success of the deal. If the same is indeed true, results will also be borne out in event 
studies in bidder gains.  
Hypothesis 1: Indian Banking M&A is a viable impact strategy and significant 
gains accrue to bidders in a M&A transaction. 
The Indian economic environment demands higher growth and rewards performers proportionately as 
significant gains accrue in acquired product markets and the same are anticipated by markets. Banks 
create opportunities for growth and while M&A reflects directly on the Economic growth of a 
nation/sector, Banking M&A more pertinently favors economic growth and these gains add to the value 
of the combined company shared between the acquirer and the target. The expected gains for the 
acquirer are unlikely to be masked by other challenges in a high growth environment as traded values 
factor in longer term synergies from the deal.  While size has a negative coefficient in most models we 
could deploy, attendant factors like Multiple acquisitions (>2) are highly indicative of the overall positive 
effect of size on Abnormal returns. 
 
3.2 Bank mergers present a financing ease 
The second primary theme of this study proposes to identify the characteristics of the Banking M&A 
transaction that prioritize the strategy for CXOs and Boards to decide in favor of the strategy to achieve 
growth. The primary nature of merger in the industry is a horizontal merger.  
As a merger between equals that assimilates two different organizations in the same product markets, 
diversification gains are ruled out in a banking merger. Regulators also frown upon diversification deals 
specifically. In that banking mergers are horizontal mergers, it also clarifies that certain other success 
adducing characteristics of the deal are facilitated in a banking merger transaction, adding to the 
attractiveness of the deal.  Cost of funds are critical to the banking business valuations and imply an 
economy of scale dimension. Financing the deal is a critical M&A dimension supporting a successful 
merger and weaning out the failed ones. Cash as a source of financing defines both commitment to the 
deal and as a scarce commodity. 
Consider AB and BB are two banks considering a merger transaction. Leverage constraints specified by 
the regulator are 1:5 for NBFCs and 1:10 for Banks for each dollar of equity. Even if AB and BB are 
leveraged 1:6 each they require the leverage for their cost of funds strategy as they maintain a loan 
book and take deposits to reduce the cost of funds. The banks also increase their value from fee based 
income and trading in Fixed Income and Equity within prescribed limits. They regularly use Derivatives 
for Off Balance sheet management of their exposure and leverage is within norms with a controlled 
NPA exposure with Gross NPA under 1%. These conditions ensure that this is not a Tender offer 
mediated by the Central Bank(regulator). Out theory postulates that in such a bank merger, AB and BB 
shareholders will not question the stock swap and merger valuation will not be contingent on use of 
cash to show commitment or use reasonable debt strategies (including LBO) for financing the deal. A 
stock swap for such a deal can be arrived at using market valuations and other asset based valuations. 
Promoters of the Target BB may stay on as shareholders and exit later much after the merger has been 
completed at then market valuations of the combined bank.   It is known that overbidding concerns will 
mar the transaction’s prospects or increase optimism for the deal. It is also assumed that AB will finance 
the deal with new debt or equity. The use of a stock swap is painless for the acquirer, and AB prefers to 
overpay if equity is well priced in the markets to ease the completion of the deal as capital is preserved 
in the Banking company. The other determinants of deal complexity being primarily the size of AB and 
BB, and organizational cultures and the technology of the industry are equally applicable for both AB 
and BB. The induced leverage in AB may be evaluated by concerned shareholders’ while evaluating the 
suitability of the transaction and the value accretion to AB from the deal.  
 
 
Hypothesis 2: Horizontal mergers, especially Banking M&A are economical and 
present low Opportunity cost barriers for an impact strategy making it extremely 
attractive to managers, owner-promoters and shareholders. 
 
In a mandated merger under a tender offer, where independent valuation of both banks is established 
by an approved valuation method to determine the swap ratio, any semblance of negotiation that 
adversely affect the timelines of the deal is not within parties but with the regulator alone. 
These two primary themes drive the research. The third theme of the study is to prove the advantages 
accruing to Banking from being a regulated industry and the discipline of the M&A transaction within 
the same Corporate Governance framework defined by the banking regulator. The section below 
examines the determinants of the deal pertaining to the regulatory superstructure and if banking M&A 
satisfy policy perspectives for a regulatory commitment. Banking reforms are a moving target. As such 
the regulator is dealing with a banking sector that is 70% specified by public sector undertakings while 
the government is committed to reducing its stakes in these Public-Sector Banks and licenses have 
been made available on tap for NBFCs and Individual promoters.  
Finally, the study overlays the current Global economic environment on the banking M&A transaction 
superset. The added opportunity for private sector players to gain from new opportunities presented by 
global players leaving the shores of profitable Asian domains in face of a crisis of capital shows up a 
critically significant learning for exiting Foreign banks.  This research finds that well governed players 
like ICICI Bank, Kotak and SBI proxied in our research as serial acquirers, have successfully achieved 
important merger gains.  
 
3.3 Run in with regulators 
Many reasons have been ascribed to the banking crises of 2008 that engulfed the entire global economy 
for a period of 8 years and counting.  One of the first fallouts for the banks apart from federal 
Government acquiring non-controlling stakes in banks like Citi and Bank of America that impacted their 
payout plans for a few years was JP Morgan’s purchase of WaMu and Bear Stearns’ in March 2007 
and Wells Fargo’s purchase of Wachovia in the Eastern seaboard. While the first few discussed cases 
are ongoing, JP Morgan is for all purposes paying dearly for the purchase, not generating any regulatory 
arbitrage and paying fines on the acquired mortgage and securities portfolios, Wells Fargo has prima 
facie shown that mega mergers can be fruitful for the bank and for the general economy. Our review 
shows that many have questioned the veracity of market power ambitions and effects of increased 
market concentrations that may intercede in most jurisdictions and in the Indian case most such 
acquisitions done by Private Banks like ICICI Bank and Bank of Rajasthan have indeed boosted 
productivity of the acquirer.  
In the specific Indian scenario, there is the added restrictions of new Private Banks licensed in the 1994 
edition and later in 2000 having been recently requested by the Central Bank to preen promoter holdings 
to stable 15% from 40% allowed during incorporation and initial listing on the exchanges. This will also 
impact any study of change of control in our case as new banks circa 2015 will again start under a new 
FOHC structure and with higher promoter stakes of 40%. Both present us with an opportunity to study 
market transactions of banks and to – be banks, which prima facie are value destroying only because 
of the regulatory uncertainty perceived in public markets.  
Expectations of transparency by the regulator also makes more data available in the public domain.  
Cebenoyan (2008) use the 1994 and 1999 changes in US Bank regulation to analyze a unified industry 
model post deregulation, as profit motives are replaced by scaling up strategies, necessitating changes 
in industry structure.  
Brune (2015) relating positive post-merger performance to the paucity of capital for the acquirer to the 
banking industry. This reiterates the view that when there is a shortage of capital better decisions are 
made because of the twin effects of better target selection and lower acquisition premium.  
 4. Experiment Design  
 
4.1 Event Studies 
Event studies are a simple and yet robust statistical construct that allow us to measure the impact of 
any events including earnings announcements, mergers or other corporate announcements 
Kolari and Fraser(2012) and Kolari and Pynnonen (2010) provide the base for use of event studies for 
the study of Banking M&A. Event studies also provides data for Non-Parametric tests in event studies 
that can be optionally employed to improve the results. The study primarily chooses a market model 
based event study to execute the empirical analysis.   
Event studies have traditionally favored the analysis of merger and acquisition values to investors in 
both short horizon and long horizon event studies. Dynamic panel regressions are otherwise employed 
in Corporate Finance Literature to study trends delineated in time series and cross-sectional models 
and often used in determining fixed effects.  
Kolari and Pynnonen(2010) presents an adjusted t – statistic to account for event clustering that can be 
used in our Event study analysis incorporating the Boehmer, Musumeci and Poulsen statistic used in 
Global M&A event studies. This adjusted statistic specifies corrections for event induced variance and 
event clustering. Non-parametric analysis can also be considered in event studies as per Kolari and 
Pynnonen(2007) where results are likely to be affected. Our sample is easily decoded for event induced 
variance and clustering.  
As an alternate, the study employs robust regression in Stata with the OLS based market model as 
these improvements do not meaningfully change the results of the study. This is also supported by the 
larger Positive Abnormal Return statistics available in the sample compared with standard errors in the 
sample. However, it is imperative that accurate valuation be available to make comparisons and thence 
only public companies’ transactions can be considered in any eventual study confirming the primary 
hypothesis that Indian Banking M&A is a viable impact strategy and large gains accrue to Bidders in 
the transaction. Event contamination is reduced thru selection of non-overlapping dates of events in the 
six-month period after announcement. Other Corporate Actions are ignored and only M&A events are 
considered. 
To analyze the market impact of announcements, one needs to determine a coherent estimation period 
often from -200 to -30 days and a pre-announcement period may be valid for announcements where 
market rumors are expected to make an impact between -10 to -1 days. The Announcement day return 
is computed either in a short 0, +1 windows or from -2 to +2 when a staggered impact is expected in 
the market. Event contamination is a key consideration as event clustering frequently confounds 
multiple impacts and due considerations may be made in selection of the data without such 
contamination by excluding data from firm with other key announcements in the period. A common 
method for standardizing daily returns is using the Patell (1976) model or other well explained models 
as discussed in Campbell, Lo and Mackinlay(1997) and pertaining to Boehmer(1991) and others.  
These achieve robustness required across cross sectional variation and improve the effective power of 
the test. Availability of a well sized sample and a definite level of returns also improves the power of the 
test and makes the determined results valid for prediction models. The study stays with a robust SD 
computed in stata to analyze the market model and the pursuant sophisticated market model using the 
Cross Section of Returns in Fama(1992). Binary and Multinomial logit models may be employed in 
follow on research to discover the causation and size of the effects in pooled and cross-sectional 
regression.  
 
4.2 Data  
24 mergers and acquisitions are chosen from the SDC Platinum database reported for Indian Banks 
and eligible Financial Companies (such as Holding Investment companies) where the Deal Value is 
available in the database denoting the purchase price paid by a public acquirer, and at least the Public 
Acquirer is a listed entity, traded on one of the Indian stock exchanges BSE or NSE.  The Date of 
Announcements inked on these merger bids lie between January 2006 to December 2015.  Deals 
occurring later may not be selected without a complete analysis of the post-merger announcement 
period. The sample thus begins with the United Western Bank acquisition by the publicly listed IDBI 
Limited and continue till the acquisition of the Diamond Jewelry business of ING Vysya Bank. Business 
unit and Loan portfolio sales are included as Targets if Deal Value data is available from the SDC 
Platinum database and/or the Acquirer/ Bidder is a listed Bank / Bank Holding Company. Simultaneous 
/ joint bids for the same target is included in one case (IFCI is the Target).  The sample includes bids 
for part stakes made by Bank Acquirers in case of a listed acquirer (ING Vysya bid to acquire stakes in 
Kotak and Centurion Bank of Punjab)  The two global businesses included without Deal Value 
particulars enhance the reliability of results obtained from the OLS analysis of the Abnormal returns 
statistics presented in the results. 
The increased heterogeneity of the sample makes it imperative to separate the characteristics of PSU 
and Private Bidders/Acquirers across salient characteristics. The data is structured in Table 2.  The 
reverse chronological deal data with dates of announcement, effective merger and Deal Value are 
included in Table 1 to make a coherent analysis in line with industry and country based environmental 
factors. 
The major mergers include CBOP acquisition by HDFC Bank Ltd, Bank of Rajasthan acquisition by 
ICICI Bank Ltd, and the Kotak Mahindra and ING Vysya Bank Ltd merger. Kotak and ICICI have become 
serial acquirers with 3 M&A Deals in the sample. SBI is also considered a serial acquirer because of 
the proposed merger of Four remaining associate banks with SBI. 
 
4.3 Market Model 
A Market model based event study is chosen for the analysis. Market models are computed from the 
OLS regressions on computed returns Ri and Rm as under:  
Ri =t + tRm 
Abnormal Returns are computed based on the model as  
ARi = Ri -i - iRm 
In this methodology, large negative  coefficient  for Kotak in one of the largest deals in the sample, 
that of the Kotak ING merger. The Betas are dynamic and we are assured that the market model while 
being sensitive is accurate for the event windows under consideration.  
Enhancements are possible considering an alternate model in due course to retrieve specific deal 
information in this case from Kolari and Pynnonen (2010).  
Abnormal returns are chosen according to the following schema, including longer range Cumulative 
Abnormal Returns measures.  
Target Cumulative Abnormal Returns are computed from -20 to +75 closing with acquisition being 
completed (The timelines are measured in trading days)  
Bidder/Acquirer Cumulative Abnormal Returns are computed across pre-announcement, 
announcement and post announcement to the completion of the acquisition (Date of Effective Merger) 
More than one Announcement window is chosen to compare results.  
Pre-Announcement: Information Leakage period from -15 to +0  
Announcement period: -2 to +2 and -1 to +1 
Post Announcement Period: 0 to +15 and +15 to +75  
Standard errors are adjusted using the Robust Standard error as per the requirement.  
5. Results and Discussion 
Table 3 specifies the Cumulative Abnormal returns, read in from market models constructed for 20 
transactions. Target returns were enumerated in the 7 valid cases over the two chosen windows. The 
longer-range window stops at the occasion of trading being suspended in the target on the recognized 
stock exchange. Acquirer/Bidder returns were obtained in all cases. The Deal value can be used in 
addition to classify transactions as per the requirements of the analysis.  
The couple of transactions that are not presented in Table 3 were not considered material after 
evaluating the other cases.  The Transactions have not been pooled and thence the CARs were not 
additionally verified with overall SARs/SCARs as specified in the literature.    
An alternative methodology was considered using pooled SARs and separate PSU and Private Sector 
Bank transactions and was discarded for lack of additional value. This methodology would have entailed 
the use of an OLS regression on the computed SCAR statistic, using a Dummy variable.   
The Kotak ING merger produced very large Positive Acquirer Returns in both the 0 to +15 days and the 
+15 to +75-day event windows. The CAR returns are 13.4755% in the Post Announcement 0 to +15 
event window. It keeps most of its gains in the longer horizon estimation period, adding another 
10.3292% in the +15 to +75 window.   
The earlier stake purchase in 2007 by ING Vysya Bank in Kotak Bank Ltd, challenging the regulation 
limits produced a -10.9522% CAR in the acquirer, ING Vysya Bank and a large 34.87058% gain in 
Kotak Mahindra Bank as Target. Interestingly Kotak Mahindra Bank’s coefficients in the market model, 
vary extremely.  The i is -4.0294 in the 2007 transaction period and -0.4488 in the 2014 transaction 
period. 
The pre-announcement gains are reflected in a CAR of 8.062% in the -15 to +0 window. The 
Announcement returns that are found generally positive in the bidder wealth M&A literature are 8.29% 
in the -2 to +2 window and 10.16% in the -1 to +1 window. The 0 to +1 Window produces a CAR of 
11.125%.  
All the CAR are positive for the Kotak ING merger in the Bidder reflecting the significant synergy gains 
from the deal. As a horizontal merger where the ING promoters exited the bank only in End April 2016, 
the merger also benefitted from the easy construction of the deal financing.   
Kotak Bank also benefitted immensely over its acquisition of foreign portfolio of Barclays Cards in 
February 2012. Other portfolio acquisitions are not considered as deal value was not provided. 
However, they are not considered for event contamination, not lying in the relevant period either. The 
i for this transaction period is 1.1161 showing Kotak was not leading the market anymore and gained 
from its large acquisitions that increased its physical distribution, reach and portfolio at the expense of 
exiting Foreign banks. This sale also pertains to the period of Global turmoil and explains our assertion 
that Foreign Banks are losing heavily by exiting profitable business opportunities in Emerging Markets 
in Asia and India.  
The other large mergers included in the analysis are HDFC Bank – Centurion Bank of Punjab and ICICI 
Bank – Bank of Rajasthan.  The Target returns are negative for Centurion Bank of Punjab reflecting 
specific opinions of decision makers, while the ICICI Bank – BOR merger and Kotak – ING are 
expectedly high at 24.56 and 25.23%.  Announcement returns are negative around the BOR acquisition 
by ICICI Bank as it reflects poorly on a large Private sector bank acquiring an individual promoter 
controlled bank with Corporate Governance issues.  The ICICI Bank executive statements also 
confirmed that the bank over bid for the branch network of Bank of Rajasthan.  However, the transaction 
also goes on to show that the deal synergies were accrued over the purchase price, topping 11.4434% 
in the longer horizon CAR in the +15 to +75 window. 
The three bank M&A in the chosen period show that Banking M&A is a viable impact strategy.   
The four PSU / PSU transactions are however show market valuations reflecting significant Post 
Announcement gains in the 0 to +15 window for only the CanFin Homes acquisition while the State 
Bank of Indore assimilation into SBI is done at par. Two acquisitions show negative returns in the 0 to 
+15 window within -4.7% to -5.3%.  
The ING Vysya stake purchase of stake in CBOP shows negative post announcement returns reflecting 
regulatory vacillation that may be ascribed to local public sentiment and can be analyzed with specific 
macroeconomic factors and / or the suitability of policy imperatives described for the period. 
The incidence of negative Target returns in the IFCI acquisition by Kotak and IDFC is documented in 
the negative target returns to IFCI showing net losses in the deal i.e. a negative merger valuation for a 
defunct IFCI.  
The earliest IDBI and Federal Bank acquisitions in the smaller bracket of deals show negative post 
announcement returns affirming challenges of creating synergies in smaller transactions. However, the 
latter transaction shows longer horizon post announcement returns reflect added synergies in the deal.  
The three different acquisitions by ICICI Bank in the period show significant post announcement returns 
for efficient management and M&A experience in the deal.  
The study finds a significant positive relationship for serial acquirers and our explanation of the 
heterogeneity and specific deal statistics shows that positive abnormal returns are inbuilt into the M&A 
strategy especially in Horizontal mergers. Though the small sample yielded only 16 deals for the 
decomposition of Abnormal returns, a negative effect on Acquirer size can be separated from the 
significant positive effects of serial acquirers probably because the serial acquirer dummy proxies for 
reputation effects resulting from a good governance track record, and is used on three banks Kotak, 
ICICI Bank and State Bank of India frequently seen on top of Best Bank lists and all with significant 
assets.  
 
5.1 Decomposing Abnormal Returns 
Altogether, 16 deals of which only 5 have listed Targets can be further processed in different OLS 
specifications modelling the returns to separate significant characteristics. As availability of sample 
points is limited, we stay with an OLS specification with univariate tests and 2-3 independent variables 
in significant complete models generated using stata.  
The long term Abnormal returns including the Information leakage period and the Long term 75-day 
Abnormal return are found to be significantly positive. This AR91 return is proxy for Deal Value and 
available Target Returns are added to the AR91DV statistic. The AR91DV statistic is positive in the 
sample with a mean of 3.74% and a t-statistic of 1.97.   The Information leakage period Abnormal 
Returns for the -15 to -1 days and the 75-day return including announcement from 0 to +75 days have 
a positive mean as well. Table 4 presents the Abnormal Return Statistics for the study. The 
Announcement Return (-2 to +2 days) and Short Term 0 to +15 day Returns are negative but not 
significant, influenced untowardly by the last outlier purchase of loss making DB Credit Card portfolio 
by Indusind Bank 
The Information Leakage Average Abnormal Return (INFO/LEAK) is also found to be positive but as 
loss making assets may have been added in one of the last deals (cannot be confirmed) the resulting 
bump in heterogeneity robs the sample of significance in the positive Abnormal return. The 
Announcement Returns (AnnRet) and the Short-term Acquisition Returns(STAR) are not found to be 
significant but are positive.  In 7 of the 16 cases, Announcement Returns over the entire trading week 
(5-day window) as well as Information leakage period returns are significantly positive. The Post 
Announcement Short Term Acquisition Return (0 to +15 days) is positive in 5 of the 16 cases including 
all 3 cases with Kotak as acquirer and 2 of 3 cases where ICICI Bank is acquirer. As expected 
Announcement Returns and Short Term Acquisition Returns both correlate highly with the Long-Term 
Acquisition Return. The 75-day Acquirer Return also correlates highly with the Deal Value Abnormal 
Returns (AR91DV) including Target returns. 
Financial Characteristics for Targets and Acquirers are chosen from the latest standalone Balance 
sheet as of the Date of Announcement. These include the ratio of Fee to Interest income, Loan Deposit 
Ratio and Total Assets from the latest Balance sheet as well as the ratio of Tier I Capital to total assets. 
Profitability is tried in different Pre-tax measures over Assets (TROA; AROA) and Equity (TROE; 
AROE).  Eps is also chosen. The DROE dummy is introduced when Target is lossmaking. None of the 
Acquirers are lossmaking. Log of Assets and Loans are chosen to represent size alternately while Deal 
value is used in Rupees Billions as well as percent of Target assets. Efficiency is measured as percent 
of Non-Interest expenses over the Net Income after Loan loss provisions and LLP are measured as 
percent of Loan assets. Growth is measured from the loan growth in the latest year balance sheet. 
We use MULT as a dummy variable in the limited sample to identify serial acquirers ICICI Bank, Kotak 
Bank and State Bank of India which have more than 2 mergers in the sample. This variable also thus 
proxies for reputation and corporate governance as these banks frequently top Best Bank and Largest 
bank lists throughout the period covered by the sample and are significantly large players in India. 
Similarly, the dummy for Private targets PVT is equally proxied and already counted in the non-presence 
of Financial data on quality of earnings and size of target etc. We also attempt to use Regulatory stance 
as a dummy variable in the specification to account for regulator’s intervention in facilitating the deal as 
evidenced in the first four deals as call for tender bids directly by the regulator and other secondary 
information. Our sample will benefit from other research including some other bigger Bank mergers in 
India and of countries where growth memes and regulatory environments are comparable. The Deal 
Financing variable was added not as dummy as mixed financing of deals was possible. However, in the 
available information, there are five cases where the variable holds the value of 1 including the Kotak 
ING merger and the ICICI Bank- Sangli Bank merger with positive Abnormal returns in each chosen 
event window. The ICICI Bank – BOR merger and HDFC Bank CBOP merger are value destroying 
except in the overall deal value event window (AR91DV). In all other cases the Deal Financing variable 
was found to be 0 and this proxies with the use of 100% cash to complete the deal accelerated probably 
by selfish target motives including international players looking to rebuild core capital from Asian 
business sales. Target Characteristics show a significant regression with the 75-day Acquirer return 
(Deal size as percent of Target assets TVALPER and Loan Deposit Ratio) The Leakage window shows 
gains related to due diligence results and that is why it is likely positive in this period. It relates very 
significantly with Acquirer Identity (MULT) and negatively with Acquirer current ROA as investors reward 
the firm for a timely strategic decision improving its ROA.  
As an additional verification, the LEAK and STAR returns are added to form the 31-day Abnormal 
Return, SHORT as well. Each model is distinct in the variables it explains. The accompanying table 
includes only some of the univariate relationships attempted. Some places show change in relationship 
signs in different returns such as AR91DV and LEAK for target returns but the model with significant F 
statistic is chosen. The relationship in LEAK variables is transferred on to Acquirer Identity only in the 
post announcement 15-day window as implementation concerns rely entirely on the proposed 
acquisition calendar and the key is acquirer identity. The STAR return becomes more correlated with 
Acquirers own LLP (AABSLLP) in Billions of Rupees. The relationship is not significant except with 
MULT. 
Table 5 presents all patterns tested in the allowed OLS specifications. Table 5 additionally  presents 
the same models with test values of Adjusted R2, F statistic for the model and the resulting p value with 
AIC and rank.  We present here the OLS models found significant and complete for each of the 
Abnormal Return statistics laying caution to the reliance on a small sample.  
 
AR91DV = 0.79361384 -0.1480839*ALSIZE +0.50804401*MULT +1.0270271*TLLP 
  (2.72)          (-3.32)   (4.70)   (1.55)   
     *  **     *** 
 
The 91-Day Deal Value Abnormal Return model is significant when including the Target’s Loan loss 
provisions, with Acquirer Size significant at the 1% level and the MULT proxy for serial acquirers 
significant at the 0.1% level. This also reflects on the 91-day return being able to predict accurately on 
the long-term performance of the merger as the markets absorb all information related to due diligence 
and the plans shared by the acquisition team in place.  
 
There is no significant model for Deal Financing in the Financials or business ratios of the Acquirer or 
Target as expected. The presented model for just the 75-day Acquirer Returns AR75 is not significant 
at 90% but has a positive F stat of 2.54 and Adjusted R2 of 17%  
 
AR75 = 0.06591481 – 0.37435247*TLDRAT + 0.49216514*TVALPER 
 
The AR75 is highly correlated to the Deal value and additionally provides a hint into the dependence of 
Positive Abnormal Returns on Target selection with Target Business parameter of Loan Deposit Ratio 
and Deal size as a percentage of Target Assets. This model shows that the Acquirer gains are biased 
in for completed mergers and is positively related to increasing Deal size, thus  for a healthy target Deal 
premium is not a show stopper while Distressed loans may drive down the value of the Target but may 
ensure higher returns to the Acquirer, given the overall value in the deal.  
  
The model on Announcement Returns shows the impact of Deal Financing (1=100% Stock). Again, the 
model is significant only at the 90% level 
 
AnnRet = -0.03408931 +0.08202507*MULT -0.04602646*DFINAN 
 
Also, announcement Returns are the least biased to Positive abnormal returns in consonance with the 
global event study literature.  
 
 
 The AR91DV return also performs in a complete model with Acquirer Efficiency Ratio and Target 
Distressed Assets (LLP)  
 
AR91DV =  -1.2868967 +1.1932765*TLLP +1.3388421*AEFF +4.1145259*ACQTIERI 
   (-4.17)  (1.70)        (3.31)     (3.82)  
The F Statistic for the model is 7.84, showing a p-value <0.01 and an Adjusted R2 of 59% 
 
The MULT variable is significant in all Abnormal Return specifications when used with the LLP 
proactively totted up in Acquirer Balance sheets.  
 
STAR = -0.0729 + 0.1518*MULT + 0.1802*TLLP – 0.0037*AABSLLP 
   (4.38)            (-2.94)   
SHORT = -0.09179 + 0.22216*MULT + 0.2048*TLLP – 0.00474*AABSLLP 
       (3.27)      (-1.90)  
 
AR75    = -0.07062 + 0.21113*MULT + 0.2101*TLLP – 0.00714*AABSLLP 
       (2.29)      (-2.11)  
 
AR91    = -0.12496 + 0.36851*MULT + 0.40957*TLLP – 0.00875*AABSLLP 
       (3.57)        (-2.31) 
 
AR91 is the same as AR91 DV including the leakage period INFO, the short-term Return STAR from 0 
to +15 and the remaining period from +16 to +75 as well as any Target returns sharing the Deal returns  
 
The impact of being a serial acquirer continues increasing over the longer event windows chosen in this 
short horizon event study analysis. 
 
These positive abnormal returns for Serial acquirers confirms the positive role of good governance in 
ensuring Positive Acquirer Returns and bringing the Event study literature closer to Corporate Finance 
theory.  
 
Mergers & Acquisitions remain a viable strategy for Acquirers with Positive Abnormal returns to 
acquirers with good governance giving confidence to them to manage the target especially if it is 
purchased at value. Our sample of Bank M&A from India thus proves our hypothesis and rejects 
overarching inferences made till now in the event study literature. 
 
 
6. Possible Implications 
Bank M&A is a viable impact strategy 
The Larger banks especially the newer private sector banks benefit from Indian growth memes. They 
can capitalize on market opportunities as they prove superior executive management skills in a 
competitive market environment.   
Ease of financing Bank mergers  
Bank mergers are easy to canvas and create more immediate value opportunities with CEO Managers 
not conflicted except for express agency concerns, while making decisions in the interests of the 
shareholders.   
Institutional ownership  
Andrio et al(2014) study the impact of institutional investors in M&A deal making in the UK where 
institutional investors increases the chances of a target being relatively larger in size with a bid for full 
control. Relative size of the target remains an important determinant in the ability of Acquirer to convert 
the deal into viable long-term profit. 
International M&A 
Research establishes India accounts for 4% of the acquirers in 2010 and roughly 2% each of the 
acquisitions in each of the four years of study. 
Differences in PSU Bank mergers and Private mergers 
PSU mergers show significant overvaluation of proposed consolidation deals. This again needs to be 
investigated from corporate governance standards built around the regulated and market linked 
corporate governance superstructure that needs to be created in an index. 
Beneficial impact of government  
Chinese SOEs have been active in making cross border acquisitions. Indian SOEs have been limited 
to more resource Industry acquisitions from BHEL and ONGC etc. However, it may still be likely that 
government enterprises from India also undertake CBA s in specific industries and complete a sectoral 
story where it may not have leading Private sector players that have the capacity to go multinational. 
These SOEs or PSEs may see better CARs in case they have the right story to convince investors of 
the value of the international acquisition.  Banking sector acquisitions outside India would however be 
contraindicated by the two transactions in consideration here.  
Pricing the acquisition 
Emerging markets like India are less likely to see bidders overbidding when dealing with targets. The 
environment has been deal rich however in the chosen decade because of value exits of foreign bank 
businesses. Retail businesses of banks and otherwise well valued businesses reflect immediate 
synergy gains in well priced acquisitions. Private units that are difficult to value in relative valuation 
models (no reliable peers) or other cash flow based (FCFE) and asset based valuations.  
Financing costs in Emerging Market M&A  
Indian MNCs and Emerging Market MNCs in general may be more active during global crises because 
of the value available in acquiring global players. E.g. Tata’s Jaguar acquisition. Emerging market 
bidders may rely on such crises to ensure value for stakeholders as cash is not likely to be available for 
financing. It is unlikely that these bidders also advantage from higher stock market valuations for global 
deals for the same reasons and LBO financing plays are likely to be critical for the bigger acquisitions 
required to prove economy of scale and accrue value advantage from the strategic acquisition over the 
long term.  As home currencies are weaker, cash should be preserved for local country businesses and 
independent leverage undertaken for financing the international deal likely in stronger currency like the 
Dollar, Euro or Pound Sterling. It is likely that IPO financing is used in private firm acquisitions with 
controlled valuations.  
Government Policy and Us vs Them 
Economic nationalism (Erel, 2012b) is significant in jurisdictions like France which becomes a deal 
breaker in international M&A. This intervention by target governments may extend deal time to 
completion and impact deal terms unfavorably not allowing markets for Corporate control to work 
symmetrically.  A large measure of success in merger deals reflected here already in timelines 
measured by regulations of time and price valuations governing such transactions. Such protection in 
making deals successful is unlikely in the international environment.  
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 8. APPENDIX  
5.2 TABLE 1: Chronological list of Deals considered in the sample for the Event study 
 
Table 1: Chronological deals as recovered from the SDC database  
in the selected period from 01 – January – 2006 to 31 – December – 2015.  
Note that Acquirors are mentioned in the first column  
 
Acquiror Name Target Name Date 
Announced 
Date 
Effective 
Host Curr. Value 
of 
Deal (mil) 
3 IDBI Ltd United western 
Bank Ltd 
01/12/06 10/03/06 836.856 
4 Federal Bank Ltd Ganesh Bank of 
Kurundwad Ltd 
01/25/06 
 
  
5 Indian Overseas 
Bank 
Bharat Overseas 
Bank 
02/07/06 
 
1,700.0 
15 ICICI Bank Ltd Lord Krishna 
Bank Ltd 
06/19/06 
 
  
19 ICICI Bank Ltd Sangli Bank Ltd 12/09/06 04/19/07 3,033.382 
 
Acquiror Name Target Name Date 
Announced 
Date 
Effective 
Host Curr. Value 
of 
Deal (mil) 
20 Bank of India Bank Swadesi 
Tbk PT 
12/11/06 02/14/07 1145.3988 
29 Canara Bank Can Fin Homes 
Ltd 
08/27/07 01/07/08 4.98 
31 Kotak Mahindra 
Bank Ltd 
IFCI Ltd 09/15/07 
 
  
32 IDFC IFCI Ltd 09/15/07 
 
  
33 ING Vysya Bank 
Ltd 
Centurion Bank 
of Punjab Ltd 
09/25/07 
 
  
34 ING Vysya Bank 
Ltd 
Kotak Mahindra 
Bank Ltd 
09/25/07 
 
  
38 State Bank of 
India 
Global Trade 
Finance Ltd 
01/24/08 03/25/08 5,205.5 
40 HDFC Bank Ltd Centurion Bank 
of Punjab Ltd 
02/25/08 05/23/08 95,259.205 
 
Acquiror Name Target Name Date 
Announced 
Date 
Effective 
Host Curr. Value 
of 
Deal (mil) 
49 National Housing 
Bank 
Mahindra Rural 
Housing Finance 
08/13/08 
 
58.0 
51 Shriram Retail 
Hldg Pvt Ltd 
Shriram City 
Union Finance 
Ltd 
09/15/08 10/15/09 1,245.8 
60 State Bank of 
India 
State Bank of 
Indore 
10/31/09 07/28/10 249.257 
62 Punjab National 
Bank 
Danabank 11/23/09 12/13/10 697.92 
70 ICICI Bank Ltd Bank of 
Rajasthan Ltd 
05/18/10 08/12/10 28,537.089 
75 Kotak Mahindra 
Bank Ltd 
Barclays-India 
Credit Card Bus 
02/01/12 02/01/12 3,000.0 
 
Acquiror Name Target Name Date 
Announced 
Date 
Effective 
Host Curr. Value 
of 
Deal (mil) 
78 Shriram City 
Union Finance 
Ltd 
Shriram Retail 
Hldg Pvt Ltd 
10/30/12 
 
21,442.897 
92 Kotak Mahindra 
Bank Ltd 
ING Vysya Bank 
Ltd 
11/20/14 04/01/15 148,660.756  
94 IndusInd Bank 
Ltd 
RBS-Diamond 
Jewellery Fin Bus 
04/10/15 07/27/15 2,870.0 
 IndusInd Bank 
Ltd 
Deutsche Bank – 
Credit Card 
Portfolios 
12/20/10 12/20/10  
 
Kotak Mahindra 
Bank Ltd 
Barclays Corp 
Loans  
01/25/13 01/25/13 
 
 
End of TABLE 1 
 5.3 TABLE 2. Sample Set and Analysis Dimensions to use for Bidder wealth / Target returns appropriation 
 
Table 2: Sample Set and Analysis 
The Transactions are classified to categorize transactions in the selected period from 01 – January – 2006 to 31 – December – 2015.  
Note that Acquirors are mentioned in the first column and Targets in the next column. For a chronological analysis refer Table 1  
Acquiror/Bidder Target 
 
DoA DoE Deal Value (INR Millions) 
           
Only Bidder/wealth effects 
  
  
    
IDBI United western  1/12/2006 10/3/2006 836.856 
Federal Bank Ltd Ganesh Bank  1/25/2006     
           
           
Microfinance          
DCB Bank Ltd 
Annapurna Microfinance 
Ltd 
 
3/1/2016   99.9 
           
Foreign Bank Acquisition ( 
P-PSU) 
         
Bank of India (P) Bank Swadesi  12/11/2006 2/14/2007 1145.3988 
Punjab National Bank(P) Danabank  11/23/2009 12/13/2010 697.92 
           
Inhouse consolidation (ILE / Not subsidiary)  - is it Financing transaction 
  
  
  
  
Shriram City Union Finance 
Ltd 
Shriram Retail Holding 
LTd 
 
9/15/2008 10/15/2009 1245.8 
Acquiror/Bidder Target 
 
DoA DoE Deal Value (INR Millions) 
Shriram City Union Finance 
Ltd 
Shriram Retail Holding 
LTd 
 
10/30/2012   21442.897 
Pvt Sector / Cooperative / RRBs / Local Private Banks 
  
  
  
  
ICICI BANK LKB         
ICICI BANK Sangli Bank      3033.382 
           
PSU / PSU transactions ( in house - two parties listed(T) , one party listed (O) ) 
  
  
  
  
IOB BOB(O)  2/7/2006   1700.0 
PSU / PSU      
Canara Bank CanFin Homes(T)  8/27/2007 1/7/2008 4.98 
SBI SBI Factors      5205.5 
SBI State Bank of Indore(O)  10/31/2009 7/28/2010 249.257 
           
Loan Portfolio/Stake Purchase 
  
       
Kotak Bank IFCI 
 
9/15/2007  Not included 
Event concomitant with Kotak 
as target  
IDFC IFCI  9/15/2007     
ING Vysya Bank Ltd CBOP Ltd  9/25/2007     
ING Vysya Bank Ltd Kotak Bank  9/25/2007     
           
           
Large Mergers          
ICICI Bank Ltd Bank o f Rajasthan    /2010 /2010  28537.089 
Kotak Bank Ltd ING Vysya Bank Ltd  11/20/2014 4/1/2015 148660.756 
Acquiror/Bidder Target 
 
DoA DoE Deal Value (INR Millions) 
HDFC Bank Centurion Bank of Punjab  2/25/2008 5/23/2008 95259.205 
           
Foreign Bank Business Exit 
  
  
  
  
Indusind Bank Ltd 
RBS - Diamond Jewelry 
Fin Business 
 
4/10/2015 7/27/2015 2870.0 
Foreign Bank Business Exit 
  
  
  
  
Indusind Bank Ltd 
Deutsche Bank – Credit 
Card Business 
 
20/12/2010   
Kotak Bank Ltd 
Barclays India - Credit 
card Business 
 
2/1/2012  3000.0 
Kotak Bank Ltd 
Barclays India – Corp 
Loans (two portfolios) 
 
25/1/2013  np* 
      
* np= not provided 
 
END OF TABLE 2  
5.4 TABLE 3: Cumulative Abnormal Returns 
 
Table 3:Cumulative Abnormal Returns 
The table presents the CAR statistic for the chosen event windows in the study. The 20 OLS market model data and regressions are not included here for reasons of brevity and clarity.   
DoA: Date of Announcement, DoE: Effective Date  
 
Acquiror/Bidder Target DoA DoE 
Deal 
Value 
(INR 
Millions) 
 
Target 
Return
s        -
20 to 
+0 
Target 
Return
s             
-20 to 
tradin
g 
closed 
 
Pre 
Announc
ement     
-15 to +0 
Announc
ement 
Returns 
-2 to +2 
Announc
ement 
Returns 
-1 to +1 
Post 
Announc
ement 
Returns 
0 to +15 
Post 
Announcement 
Returns  
+15 to +75  
           Target Returns  Acquiror Returns 
Only Bidder/wealth effects                           
IDBI United western 1/12/2006 10/3/2006 836.8 
N
o
 t
ar
g
et
 r
et
u
rn
s 
    
A
c
q
u
ir
o
r
 R
e
tu
r
n
s 
0.078 -0.016 0.027 -0.170 0.016 
Federal Bank Ltd Ganesh Bank 1/25/2006         -0.017 -0.074 -0.031 -0.044 0.123 
                        
                        
Microfinance                       
DCB Bank Ltd Annapurna Microfinance Ltd 3/1/2016   99.9               
                        
Foreign Bank Acquisition ( P-PSU)                       
Bank of India (P) Bank Swadesi 12/11/2006 2/14/2007 1145.3     -0.054 -0.092 -0.126 -0.017 -0.244 
Punjab National Bank(P) Danabank 11/23/2009 12/13/2010 697.92     -0.049 -0.028 -0.017 -0.056 -0.023 
                        
Inhouse consolidation (ILE / Not subsidiary)  - is it Financing 
transaction 
                    
Shriram City Union Finance Ltd Shriram Retail Holding Ltd 9/15/2008 10/15/2009 1245.8               
Acquiror/Bidder Target DoA DoE 
Deal 
Value 
(INR 
Millions) 
 
Target 
Return
s        -
20 to 
+0 
Target 
Return
s             
-20 to 
tradin
g 
closed 
 
Pre 
Announc
ement     
-15 to +0 
Announc
ement 
Returns 
-2 to +2 
Announc
ement 
Returns 
-1 to +1 
Post 
Announc
ement 
Returns 
0 to +15 
Post 
Announcement 
Returns  
+15 to +75  
Shriram City Union Finance Ltd Shriram Retail Holding Ltd 10/30/2012   21442.8               
Pvt Sector / Cooperative / RRBs / Local Private Banks                     
ICICI BANK LKB            0.023 -0.019 -0.003 -0.038 0.353 
ICICI BANK Sangli Bank     3033.3     -0.033 0.039 0.005 0.029 0.114 
              
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
          
PSU / PSU transactions ( in house - two parties listed(T) , one party listed (O) )                    
IOB BOB(O) 2/7/2006   1700.0     -0.118 0.033 0.031 -0.047 -0.123 
Canara Bank CanFin Homes(T) 8/27/2007 1/7/2008 10.9     0.072 0.081 0.017 0.168 0.378 
SBI SBI Factors     5205.5     0.079 -0.025 -0.005 -0.053 -0.198 
SBI State Bank of Indore(O) 10/31/2009 7/28/2010 249.2     0.190 0.093 0.010 -0.002 -0.306 
          
  
  
  
              
Loan Portfolio(P)/Stake 
Purchase(S) 
                      
Kotak Bank IFCI 9/15/2007                   
           
Loan Portfolio(P)/Stake 
Purchase(S) 
           
IDFC IFCI 9/15/2007 
 (-15 to +0) event window 
  
 -0.155             
ING Vysya Bank Ltd(S) CBOP Ltd 9/25/2007       -0.01   -0.017 
  
-0.074 
  
-0.031 
  
-0.053 -0.056 
ING Vysya Bank Ltd(S) Kotak Bank 9/25/2007       0.348   -0.109 -0.164 
             
Large Mergers                         
ICICI Bank Ltd Bank o f Rajasthan      28537.0   0.252 0.206 -0.163 -0.087 -0.078 -0.083 0.114 
Acquiror/Bidder Target DoA DoE 
Deal 
Value 
(INR 
Millions) 
 
Target 
Return
s        -
20 to 
+0 
Target 
Return
s             
-20 to 
tradin
g 
closed 
 
Pre 
Announc
ement     
-15 to +0 
Announc
ement 
Returns 
-2 to +2 
Announc
ement 
Returns 
-1 to +1 
Post 
Announc
ement 
Returns 
0 to +15 
Post 
Announcement 
Returns  
+15 to +75  
Kotak Bank Ltd ING Vysya Bank Ltd 11/20/2014 4/1/2015 148660.7   0.245 0.281   
  
  
  
0.080 0.082 0.101 0.134 0.103 
HDFC Bank Centurion Bank of Punjab 2/25/2008 5/23/2008 95259.2   -0.190 -0.285 -0.079 -0.082 -0.074  -0.053 -0.056  
          
N
o
 t
ar
g
et
 r
et
u
rn
s 
              
Foreign Bank Business Exit                       
Indusind Bank Ltd 
RBS - Diamond Jewelry Fin 
Business 
4/10/2015 7/27/2015 2870.0     0.001 0.021 0.032 -0.114 -0.016 
Kotak Bank Ltd 
Barclays India - Credit card 
Business 
2/1/2012   3000.0     0.158 0.059 0.080 0.147 -0.107 
Indusind Bank Ltd DB – Card Portfolios 20/12/2010  np*   -0.188 -0.084  -0.135 0.028 
Kotak Bank Ltd Barclays –Corp Loan  25/1/2013     np*      -0.036 0.056    0.055 0.070 
 
END OF TABLE 3 
  
5.5 TABLE 4: Abnormal Returns Statistics 
Table 4:Abnormal Returns Statistics 
The table presents the statistics for the computed Abnormal Returns in each of the chosen event windows  
S.No. Merger MA-ID 
Date of 
Announcement 
Announcement 
Return  
3 Day 
Announcement 
Return 
5 Day 
Announcement 
Return 
Information 
leakage 
period 
Acquisition 
Return 
Short Term 
Acquisition 
Return 
75day  
Acquisition 
Return (till 
trading 
stops) 
Post STAR 
Acquisition 
Return 
Deal Value 
    
Day 0 -1  to +1 -2  to +2 -15 to -1 0 to +15 0 to +75 +16 to +75 -15 to +75 
3 IDBI -UWB  MA01 Jan 12, 2006 -3.4782% -6.6996% -6.0941% 4.0436% -14.8394% -15.1527% -0.3133% -11.1091% 
4 Federal Bank - GKB MA02 Jan 25, 2006 -4.2621% -3.1096% -7.4183% 2.5474% -4.4310% 15.5886% 20.0196% 18.1360% 
5 IOB - Bharat Overseas Bank MA03 Feb 7, 2006 
    
   
 
15 ICICI Bank - Lord Krishna Bank MA04 June 19, 2006 -1.9836% -0.3268% -1.9341% 4.3419% -3.8400% 24.3657% 28.2056% 28.7076% 
19 ICICI Bank - Sangli Bank MA05 Dec 09, 2006 -3.4827% 0.5395% 3.9799% 0.1661% 2.9614% 14.5325% 11.5712% 14.6986% 
20 Bank of India - Bank Swadesi 
Indonesia MA06 Dec 11, 2006 -7.0165% -12.6035% -9.2082% 1.5411% 
-1.7146% -22.1417% -20.4271% 
-20.6006% 
29 Can Fin Homes/ Canara Bank -Is it 
Financing txn MA07 Aug 27, 2008 0.6850% 1.7683% 8.1128% 6.5510% 
16.8336% 48.6563% 31.8227% 
55.2073% 
38 SBI - Global Trade (now SBI 
Factors) MA12 
Jan 24, 2008 
4.5533% 1.0121% 9.3155% 14.5200% 
-0.2077% -28.7947% -28.5870% 
-14.2747% 
40 HDFC Bank - CBOP MA13 Feb 25, 2008 -5.5681% -7.4603% -8.2124% -2.4121% -5.3140% -10.6175% -5.3035% -34.5556% 
60 SBI - SB Indore  MA14 Oct 31, 2009 -0.6253% -0.5264% -2.5090% 8.5879% -5.3687% -24.8067% -19.4380% -16.2188% 
62 Punjab National Bank - DanaBank 
KZ MA15 
Nov 23, 2009 
-2.3101% -1.7584% -2.8320% -2.6459% 
-5.6440% -8.0694% -2.4254% 
-10.7153% 
70 ICICI Bank – BOR MA16 May 18, 2010 -7.6909% -7.8957% -8.7977% -8.6514% -8.3790% 1.7286% 10.1076% 3.3174% 
75 Kotak Bank - Barclays CCB MA17 Feb 01, 2012 2.7750% 8.0767% 5.9424% 13.0714% 14.7893% 6.9400% -7.8493% 20.0114% 
92 Kotak Bank - ING Vysya MA18 Nov 20, 2014 7.1568% 10.1622% 8.2912% 0.9052% 13.4755% 21.3327% 7.8573% 46.3064% 
S.No. Merger MA-ID 
Date of 
Announcement 
Announcement 
Return  
3 Day 
Announcement 
Return 
5 Day 
Announcement 
Return 
Information 
leakage 
period 
Acquisition 
Return 
Short Term 
Acquisition 
Return 
75day  
Acquisition 
Return (till 
trading 
stops) 
Post STAR 
Acquisition 
Return 
Deal Value 
    
Day 0 -1  to +1 -2  to +2 -15 to -1 0 to +15 0 to +75 +16 to +75 -15 to +75 
94 Indusind - RBS Diamond Jewelry MA19 Apr 10, 2015 -0.1195% 3.2683% 2.1741% 0.2295% -11.4231% -13.4298% -2.0067% -13.2003% 
 
Kotak Bank - Barclays Cor Loans 
(Two Portfolios) MA20 
Jan 24, 2013 
1.8674% 3.1150% 5.6497% -3.6281% 
5.5126% 12.5493% 7.0367% 
8.9211% 
 
Indus Ind Bank - Deutsche Bank CC  MA21 Dec 12, 2010 -2.6720% -4.8018% -8.3961% -18.7919% -13.5518% -10.7542% 2.7976% -29.5461% 
 
  
 
       
LTAR90 
 
 
Mean  -1.3857% -1.0775% -0.7460% 1.2735% -0.9358% 0.7454% 2.0667% 3.7384% 
 
 
SD 
 
4.0945% 5.9592% 6.8828% 8.0471% 9.7166% 21.1477% 16.7489% 8.0471% 
 
 
SE 
 
1.0236% 1.4898% 1.7207% 2.0118% 2.4292% 5.2869% 4.1872% 1.8967% 
 
 
t-stat 
 
-1.35 -0.72 -0.43 0.63 -0.39 0.14 0.49 1.97 
  
p-value(Significance) 0.9020631 0.7596710 0.6646068 0.2681303 0.6472707 0.4448744 0.3143741 0.033733* 
  
df 
 
15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 
  
Hypothesis 
 
mu>=0 mu>=0 mu>=0 mu>=0 mu>=0 mu>=0 mu>=0 mu<0 
  
Result 
 
 Accepted  Accepted  Accepted  Accepted  Accepted  Accepted  Accepted Rejected 
 
END OF TABLE 4  
5.6 TABLE 5: Decomposing Abnormal Returns 
Table 5: Decomposing Abnormal Returns 
The table presents the OLS specifications drawn for each of the Abnormal Returns measures for the chosen event windows in the study.  
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
    Variable |     AR91DV         STAR       AnnRet         LEAK       AR75         STAR         INFO     
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
      ALSIZE |  -.1480839**  .00203705    .01351056    .01991029   -.03859948     
        MULT |  .50804401***                                                     .08302751                             
        TLLP |  1.0270271                                                                    -.14459931  
      DFINAN |                                                                  -.02464709                              
      TLSIZE |                                                                               -.00093639   
      TARFEE |                                                                                 
      TLDRAT |                                                                                 
     TVALPER |                                                                                 
      ACQFEE |                                                                                 
       TGROW |                                                                                 
       _cons |  .79361384*  -.02825149   -.10720098   -.13425184     .2924129   -.04702466    .01421788   
-------------+------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
          r2 |  .67292195    .00058467    .05160318    .08198399    .04461617    .16499028    .01351695   
        r2_a |  .58371884   -.07080214   -.01613945    .01641141   -.02362554    .03652725   -.15089689   
           F |  7.5437053    .00819011    .76175339    1.2502786     .6537962    1.2843405    .08221299   
           p |    0.0051        0.9292       0.2823       0.3975       0.4323       0.9216       0.3363                    
         aic | -11.396841   -26.131051   -38.111103   -33.630605   -2.0733115   -27.006684   -27.697593   
         bic | -8.5646402   -24.585873   -36.565926   -32.085428   -.52813403   -24.688918   -25.573443   
        rank |          4            2            2            2            2            3            3   
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
                                                      legend: * p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001 
 
 
-------------x-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
    Variable |     DFINAN       AR75          STAR        AR91DV         LEAK       AnnRet         AR75     
-------------+------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
      ALSIZE |                                                                                            
        MULT |                            .08302751    .20673593    .06730447    .08202507*                
        TLLP |                                                                                            
      DFINAN |                           -.02464709   -.09178633   -.05197789   -.04602646                
      TLSIZE |                                                                                            
      TARFEE |  .99005064                                                                                 
      TLDRAT | -.05934193   -.37435247*                                                       -.10504388   
     TVALPER |               .49216514                                                                    
         PVT |                                                                                            
       _cons |  .21951483    .06591481   -.04702466   -.04650643   -.00467441   -.03408931    .04564861   
-------------+------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
          r2 |  .15434299    .28110773    .16499028    .13888186    .17410564    .32182717    .10931158   
        r2_a |  .02424191    .17050892    .03652725    .00640214    .04704497    .21749288    .04569098   
           F |  1.1863313    2.5416885    1.2843405    1.0483255    1.3702559    3.0845774     1.718179   
           p |     0.3363       0.1170       0.3097       0.3784       0.2884       0.0801       0.2110                                           
         aic |  24.118262   -4.6237382   -27.006684     5.118921   -33.322573   -41.477036   -3.1952076   
         bic |  26.436028    -2.305972   -24.688918    7.4366872   -31.004807    -39.15927   -1.6500302   
        rank |          3            3            3            3            3            3            2   
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
                                                        legend: * p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001 
  
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
    Variable |     AR91DV         STAR       AnnRet         LEAK         AR75         STAR        LEAK     
-------------+------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
      ALSIZE |  -.1480839**  .00203705    .01351056    .01991029   -.03859948                             
        MULT |  .50804401***                                                     .08302751                
        TLLP |  1.0270271                                                                    -.14459931   
      DFINAN |                                                                  -.02464709                
      TLSIZE |                                                                               -.00093639   
      TARFEE |                                                                                            
       TGROW |                                                                                            
       _cons |  .79361384*  -.02825149   -.10720098   -.13425184     .2924129   -.04702466    .01421788   
-------------+------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
          r2 |  .67292195    .00058467    .05160318    .08198399    .04461617    .16499028    .01351695   
        r2_a |  .58371884   -.07080214   -.01613945    .01641141   -.02362554    .03652725   -.15089689   
           F |  7.5437053    .00819011    .76175339    1.2502786     .6537962    1.2843405    .08221299   
           p |    0.0051        0.9292       0.2823       0.3975       0.4323       0.9216       0.3363                    
         aic | -11.396841   -26.131051   -38.111103   -33.630605   -2.0733115   -27.006684   -27.697593   
         bic | -8.5646402   -24.585873   -36.565926   -32.085428   -.52813403   -24.688918   -25.573443   
        rank |          4            2            2            2            2            3            3   
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
                                                        legend: * p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001 
  
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
    Variable |     DFINAN       AR75          STAR        AR91DV         LEAK       AnnRet         AR75     
-------------+------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
      ALSIZE |                                                                                            
        MULT |                            .08302751    .20673593    .06730447    .08202507                
        TLLP |                                                                                            
      DFINAN |                           -.02464709   -.09178633   -.05197789   -.04602646                
      TLSIZE |                                                                                            
      TARFEE |  .99005064                                                                                 
      TLDRAT | -.05934193   -.37435247                                                       -.10504388   
     TVALPER |               .49216514                                                                    
         PVT |                                                                                            
       _cons |  .21951483    .06591481   -.04702466   -.04650643   -.00467441   -.03408931    .04564861   
-------------+------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
          r2 |  .15434299    .28110773    .16499028    .13888186    .17410564    .32182717    .10931158   
        r2_a |  .02424191    .17050892    .03652725    .00640214    .04704497    .21749288    .04569098   
           F |  1.1863313    2.5416885    1.2843405    1.0483255    1.3702559    3.0845774     1.718179   
           p |     0.3363       0.1170       0.3097       0.3784       0.2884       0.0801       0.2110                                           
         aic |  24.118262   -4.6237382   -27.006684     5.118921   -33.322573   -41.477036   -3.1952076   
         bic |  26.436028    -2.305972   -24.688918    7.4366872   -31.004807    -39.15927   -1.6500302   
        rank |          3            3            3            3            3            3            2   
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
                                                        legend: * p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
    Variable |       AR75       AR91DV         LEAK         AR75         AR75        SHORT        SHORT    
-------------+------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
      TLDRAT | -.10504388    -.3454186    .06937377   -.47805764*                                          
     TVALPER |               .38744754    -.1420714    .58009855                                          
         PVT |                                        -.12700236                                          
        AROE |                                                     -1.0210396                             
        TROE |                                                                   .14612131     .3579582   
       DTROE |                                                                                .23392544   
        AEFF |                                                                                            
        TEFF |                                                                                            
       _cons |  .04564861    .09264093    .00992665     .1532491    .20053833    .01910947    .00364562   
-------------+------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
          r2 |  .10931158     .1842522    .10365578    .34118711    .10636877    .17658784    .18999105   
        r2_a |  .04569098    .05875254   -.03424333    .17648389    .04253797    .11777269    .06537429   
           F |   1.718179     1.468149     .7516784    2.0715266    1.6664176    3.0024208    1.5246027   
           p |     0.2110       0.2661       0.4910       0.1170       0.2176       0.1051       0.2542                                              
         aic | -3.1952076    4.2528975   -32.012851   -4.0200894   -3.1424313   -15.005469   -13.268055   
         bic | -1.6500302    6.5706637   -29.695084   -.92973446   -1.5972539   -13.460292   -10.950289   
        rank |          2            3            3            4            2            2            3   
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
                                                        legend: * p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001 
 
 
  
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
    Variable |       AR75         AR75       AR91DV       AR91DV       AR91DV       AR91DV       SHORT     
-------------+------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
      ALSIZE |                           -.07336437                -.07694798    -.1480839**                
        MULT |                            .25182314    .17231606    .27175106    .50804401***                
        TLLP |                                                                   1.0270271                
      TARFEE |                           -.23624551                                                       
      TLDRAT |              -.10999273                                                                    
        AROE | -1.1608211                                                                                 
        TROE | -.10099882    .14116079                                                                    
       DTROE | -.24136756    .14673199                                                                    
        AEFF |                                                                                 .3316147   
        TEFF |                                                                                .05637519   
       TGROW |                                                                                            
       _cons |  .25868906    .03885867    .47121185   -.05797972    .46036695    .79361384*  -.23876396   
-------------+------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
          r2 |  .17087141    .11208915    .22288421    .11535703    .19246905    .67292195     .0656223   
        r2_a | -.03641073   -.10988857    .02860526    .05216825    .06823352    .58371884   -.07812811   
           F |  .82434216    .50495676    1.1472381    1.8255935    1.5492271    7.5437053    .45650166   
           p |     0.5053       0.6861       0.6433       0.1981       0.2492       0.0051       0.6433                                                     
         aic | -.34111829     .7548192    5.4766435    3.5501598    4.0909157   -11.396841   -10.982688   
         bic |  2.7492366    3.8451741    8.5669983    5.0953373    6.4086819   -8.5646402   -8.6649214   
        rank |          4            4            4            2            3            4            3   
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
                                                        legend: * p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001 
 
 
 
 
 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
    Variable |      LEAK         STAR         SHORT        STAR         STAR        SHORT         AR75     
-------------+------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
      ALSIZE |                                                                                            
        MULT |  .05278443    .07450713    .12729156    .09715943    .15186089**  .22216176**     .21113*   
        TLLP |                                                      .18020194    .20480011    .21009861   
        AROA | -.28608395   -.04156175   -.32764571                                                       
     AABSLLP |                                        -.00249838   -.00374489*  -.00474092   -.00714383   
    ACQTIERI |                                                                                            
      ACQFEE |                                                                                            
       TGROW |                                                                                            
       _cons |   .0075261   -.04738917   -.03986307   -.03640253   -.07288215   -.09179805   -.07062496   
-------------+------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
          r2 |  .42692934    .15752571    .29275064    .24788635    .65715995    .50987759    .38864625   
        r2_a |  .33876462    .02791428    .18394304    .13217656    .56365812    .37620784    .22191341   
           F |  4.8424058     1.215369     2.690535     2.142311     7.028311    3.8144576     2.330952   
           p |     0.0268       0.3282       0.1052       0.1570       0.0066       0.0427       0.1305                                             
         aic | -39.169898   -26.864288   -15.438647   -28.679579   -39.575565   -19.405798   -10.233906   
         bic | -36.852132   -24.546522    -13.12088   -26.361813   -36.743364   -16.573597   -7.4017057   
        rank |          3            3            3            3            4            4            4   
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
                                                        legend: * p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
    Variable |       AR91        lteq       lteqfee       ltgrow       lar91v     
-------------+----------------------------------------------------------------- 
        MULT |  .36851185**                                                       
        TLLP |  .40957314                                           1.1932765   
        AEFF |                                                      1.3388421   
     AABSLLP | -.00874915*                                                       
    ACQTIERI |               2.9257313    2.8957282    2.7193167    4.1145259   
      ACQFEE |                            .33543022                             
       TGROW |                                        -.31083053                
       _cons | -.12496244   -.21712219   -.36229518   -.18566267   -1.2868967   
-------------+----------------------------------------------------------------- 
          r2 |  .55877203    .16502437    .25377407    .24964445    .68142222   
        r2_a |  .43843714    .10538325    .13897008    .13420513    .59453737   
           F |  4.6434745    2.7669564    2.2104987      2.16256    7.8428199   
           p |     0.0248       0.1184       0.1492       0.1546       0.0045    
         aic | -6.9063986    2.6256543    2.8276683    2.9159682   -11.791824   
         bic | -4.0741978    4.1708318    5.1454345    5.2337344    -8.959623   
        rank |          4            2            3            3            4   
------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
                                       legend: * p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001 
 
---------END OF TABLE 5 
